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Abstract:  This  paper  aims  at evaluating the  efficacy  of monetary  policy  in controlling  macroeconomic 
instability in  Nigeria. The analysis performed is based on a rational expectation framework that incorporates 
the fiscal role of exchange rate. Using annual data spanning from 1980 to 2010, the study affirmsthat the effort 
of  monetary  policy  in  Nigeria  aimed  at  influencing  the  finance  of  government  fiscal  deficit  through  the 
determination  of  the  inflation-taxrate  affects  both  the  rate  of  inflation  and  the  real  exchange  rate,  thereby 
causing volatility in these rates. The policy import of the paper is that monetary policy should be set in such a 
way that the objective it seeks to achieve is well defined and articulated. 
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I. Introduction 
Generally,monetary policyseeksto achieve the basic macroeconomic goals through the attainment of 
economic stability. It, therefore, becomes obvious that instability in monetary policy in Nigeria cannot be 
appraised in isolation of macroeconomic instability. To suggest otherwise would imply a relegation or, worse 
still, ignorance of the essence of monetary policy. Macroeconomic instability can be regarded as a situation of 
economic malaise, where the economy does not seem to have settled in steady equilibrium position, thereby 
making it difficult to make predictions and good planning (Azam, 2001). As we see in Abiodun and 
Tokunbo(2006), this definition of macroeconomic instability suffers from lack of precision. The writers further 
note that monetary policy focuses precisely on theachievement of price stability, with respect to bothdomestic 
and external prices. While inflation rateis often used to track movement in domestic pricelevel, exchange rate is 
used as a policy tool forensuring external price stability and enhancing exportperformance (Caballero and 
Corbo, 1989). 
This study examines the efficacy of monetarypolicy in controlling inflation rate and exchange 
ratevolatility or instability. As a means of achieving this, asimple monetary model with rational expectationthat 
emphasizes the fiscal role of the real exchangerate is used.The fiscal role of real exchange rate is particularly 
relevant to Nigeria since the bulk of government revenue is derived from foreign exchange earnings. The model 
is derived from the sunspot equilibria theory in which Woodford (1986), and Drugeon and Wignolle (1996) 
have demonstrated that macroeconomic instability is related to multiple (a continuum of) rational expectation 
equilibria.In the theoretical model, thelinks between high inflation and the joint volatility of the real exchange 
rate and inflation rate, as well as some aspects of government’s fiscal andexchange rate policies are illustrated in 
a rationalexpectation equilibrium framework. In this model,inflation rate and the real exchange ratesare jointly 
determined by the equilibrium of the model. This study, therefore, examines how inflation as a monetary policy 
target, impacts onrelative prices and their instability/volatility, therebyimpairing market signals. 
The rest of the study is divided into foursections. Section 2 provides an overview ofmonetary policy and 
macroeconomic instability in Nigeria.Section 3 presents the theoretical framework ofthe rational expectation 
model. Section 4 presents the empirical results and section 5concludes the study. 
 
II. Overview Of Monetary Policyand Macroeconomic  
Instability In Nigeria (1980 – 2010) 
The role of the CBN has always been anchored on the use of monetarypolicy that is usually targeted 
towards theachievement of full-employment equilibrium, rapideconomic growth, price stability, and 
externalbalance. Over the years, the major goals ofmonetary policy have often been the two laterobjectives. 
Thus, exchangerate policy and inflation targeting have dominated CBN’s monetary/rational expectationpolicy 
focus based on assumption that these areessential tools of achieving macroeconomicstability.Monetary policy in 
Nigeria has been carriedout through the portfolio behaviour of the CBNin terms of the control of its credit 
andmanagement of reserves (Abiodun and Tokunbo, 2006). Credit control measure such as the use of Open 
Market Operations (OMO) and selective credit are used to check movement in domestic price level, while the 
exchange rate policies such the fixed, managed and floating exchange rate regimes serve as measurefor 
   
determining the competitiveness and currentaccount performance as well as foreign reserves. Figure 2.1 and 
figure 2.2 show the trends in some of the Central Bank of Nigeria’s (CBN’s) credit control measures in history.  
 
Figure 2.1: CBN’s reserves/domestic credit.    Figure 2.2:CBN’s credit to Government 
 
 
Figure 2.1 indicates that during the first half of the 1980s, CBN’s reserves to domestic credit ratio witnessed 
continual decline.It, however, startedto increase from 1986 tillabout 1993. From late 1993, the ratio nose-dived 
but picked up by 2005.The trend in the ratio coincides with the three differentexchange rate regimes, namely the 
fixed, managed/pegged and floating exchange rate regimes. The period 1980 to 1986 (which is the era of fixed 
exchange regime)was marked by overvaluation of domesticcurrency, Naira vis-à-vis other trading partners’ 
currencies (especially US dollars). The first substantialincrease in reserves was during the devaluationyears 
(1986-1992). However, the devaluation was characterized by managed-float exchange rate regime. InMarch 
1992-when the floating exchange rate wasadopted by the merging of official exchange ratewith the parallel 
market rate-there was an initialshock in the system and this affected the reservespositively. But this positive 
shock was not sustained as evidenced by the subsequent decrease in theratio.The decrease may be attributed to 
great hike in CBN’s creditto the Federal Government. From figure 2.2, therewas a huge increase in the 
allocation of credit togovernment starting from about 2000. Fromfigure 2.3 below, there was an appreciation in 
nominaleffective exchange rate (NEER) between thePeriod 1980 and 1993. The NEER however remained 
relatively stable between the periods 1993 to 1996. Thereafter, it took a bullish trend, reaching a zenith in mid 
1990s and declined thereafter. On theother hand, the general price level-proxied by the consumer price index 
(CPI)-is highly variegated. This has led to wide gyration and volatility (instability) in domesticprices. The trend 
of volatility in inflation is also buttressed in figure 2.3 as under: 
 
Figure 2.3: Nominal Effective Exchange Rate(NEER) and Inflation (CPI), (1980-2010). 
 
The floating exchangerate regime, starting from about 1992, brought about increase in therate of 
inflation with inflation reaching a peak of72 percent in 1995 before declining to the pre-devaluation level. 
Similarly, there was a continuous real depreciation in the valueof Naira against the value of major 
tradingpartners’ currencies. This situation isdepicted in figure 2.4 by the downward trend in the realeffective 
exchange rate (REER). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-20000
0
20000
40000
60000
80000
100000
120000
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
CG=central bank's credit to government
floating exr. regim
pegged or
m
anaged regim
e
(devaluation)
fixed exr. regim
e
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
NEER=Nominal Effective Exchange Rate
0
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
CPI=Consumer Price Index (inflation)
(Years)
(NEER)
Fixed Regime
    Devaluation
(managed/pegged)
      Regime
Floating Exchange Rate Regime
Fixed Regime
    Devaluation
(managed/pegged)
      Regime
Floating Exchange Rate Regime
(inflation)
(Years)
0.0
0.4
0.8
1.2
1.6
2.0
2.4
2.8
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
RCP=ratio of central bank's reserve to credit to core priv. sector
floating exchange rate regime
D
ev
al
ua
tio
n
(m
an
ag
e
d
re
gi
m
e
)
F
ix
ed
 e
xc
ha
ng
e
 r
at
e 
re
gi
m
e
   
Figure 2.4: Real Effective Exchange Rate (REER) and Inflation Rate (CPI). 
 
The wide swings in the trend of REER above suggest that inflation-targeting of monetary policy will 
only createvolatility of both inflation rate and the REER. 
 
III. Rational Expectation Model ofinflation And Exchange 
Rate Instability 
The theoretical framework linking therelationship between instability ofREER and inflation rate 
adopted for this study drawsheavily from Azam (1999, 2001).In the model,international price of tradable goods 
in terms offoreign currency is equal to one, so that theirnominal price in domestic currency is e. Further,let us 
assume that quantity of money in theeconomy is M while the price level is P, and thatthe price level is an 
increasing (and linearlyhomogenous) function of e and of the price ofnon-tradable, assumed implicit in the 
model. If we also define q=e/P as the real exchange rate, which is an increasing (and linearly homogenous) 
function of e and of the price of tradable goods to the price of non-tradable goods. In order to effectively 
incorporate the fiscal role of exchange rate, government expenditures and revenues are split into two different 
categories, subject to how they are affected bythe exchange rate. It is assumed that governmentexpenditures are 
indexed on price level P, whileits revenues (including foreign aid) are indexedon exchange rate. Therefore, let D 
represent the excess of expenditures over revenues indexed onP and F the excess of revenues over 
expendituresindexed on e. Since the government budgetarypolicy is usually exogenous of stability objectiveof 
monetary policy, this implies that D and F canbe held constant. Consequently, the monetaryfinancing of the 
overall deficit is given by: 
dM/dt = pD–eF-------------------------------------(3.1) 
Equation 3.1 implies that the change in moneystock is used to finance fiscal deficits. If we denotethe rate of 
inflation by ₮ = ∆logp/dtand the rateof change in the local currency chosen bygovernment as d = ∆loge/dt.d is 
known as the rate of crawl. In Nigeria theexchange rate regime chosen by governmentdetermines the rate of 
crawl; therefore it isassumed that d is controlled by government. Sincethe rational expectation hypothesis 
assumesprivate agents to have perfect knowledge aboutthe market, this then indicates that they know d. The real 
rate of depreciation of the domesticcurrency is determined by the difference between the rates of change chosen 
by the governmentand the inflation rate, that is; 
dq/dt = (d - ₮)q -----------------------------------------------(3.2) 
 
If we denote real money balances by m, thenequation 3.1 can be re-written as: 
dm/dt = D – qF- ₮m -----------------------------------------(3.3) 
Assume that the demand for real moneybalances is determined as afunction of the expected rate of inflation ₮e(à 
la Cagan (1996)bythe function: 
 
m  = f(₮e), where f’<0  -----------------------------------------------(3.4) 
 
Equation 3.4 holds under the assumption ofrational expectation equilibria in which case ₮e= ₮ 
Substituting equation 3.4 into 3.3yields : 
 
d₮/dt = (1/f’)dm/dt = [1/f’][D-dF-₮f(₮)]  -----------------(3.5) 
 
 D-qF= ₮f(₮) -----------------------------------------------------(3.6) 
 
This implies that inflation is stabilized as (d₮/dt=0) for all pairs {q, p} such that: from 
equation 3.6, it can be seen that theinflation financed real seigniorage representedby the left hand side of the 
equation, is a lineardecreasing function of q. The negative slope ofthe function is reinforced by assuming that 
Dand F to be a function of q, in which case it wouldbe assumed that D’< 0 and F’> 0. Theproceeds of the 
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inflation tax, represented by theright hand side of equation 3.6is a non-monotonicconcave function of p, 
according to the inflation-taxLaffer-curve mechanism (see Bruno andFischer, 1990; Dornbusch and Fischer, 
1993). Theinflation-tax is maximized as the aggregatemaximum of the product of expected and actualinflation 
rate. This gives the inflation-tax maximizing rate as: 
 
    ₮max = agg.max[₮.f(₮)]   ------------------------------------------(3.7) 
 
Figures 3.1a and 3.1b analyze the combined effectof the exchange rate dynamics contained inequation 3.2 using 
phase diagrams. In the phasediagrams, the locus of point such that ∆q/∆t = 0is denoted Qq. Figure  3.1b 
represents the casewhere the chosen rate of crawl lies below theinflation-tax maximizing inflation rate, 
whichconnotes a saddle point with a zero-dimensionalconvergent sub-space. Then as there is no 
predeterminedvariable in the system, the economyjumps instantly at point E and stays there aslong as the chosen 
rate of crawldL (=DL)is credible. 
Figure 3.1a: dL lieabove ₮max(= INF max).  Figure 3.1b:  INFmax lie abovedL 
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Thus, the real exchange rate and the inflation rateare uniquely determined by the chosen rate 
ofcrawl.From figure 3.1b, when the chosen rate of crawlis below the inflation-tax maximizing rate ofinflation, 
there will exist a unique rationalexpectation equilibrium (E) that determines jointly therate of inflation and the 
real exchange rate. However, in figure 3.1a, there exists a distinctresult with the chosen rate of crawl dLwhich 
isgreater than the inflation-tax maximizing rate ₮max (INF max).In this case, the steady-state is stable at point 
(S). See Woodford (1986), and Drugeon and Wignolle (1996) for an exposition.In the practical sense, the 
continuum of therational expectations equilibria predicts a highvolatility for the variables in the system. 
Sincethe system has no anchor, the variables of the system become extremely unstable and jump fromone 
trajectory to the other based on the responseof private agents to information relevant to theirexpectations. 
Blanchard and Fischer (1989)also provide an elaborate theoretical exposition in thesunspot model that tries to 
capture this behaviour. 
 
IV. Empirical Investigation 
            In the application of the theoretical framework (the sunspot theory), a search procedure method (a la 
Hendry) which allows us to move from general to specific, is employed (Banerjee et al., 1993). This enables us 
to arrive at a dynamic relationship between variables of the theoretical system as applied by Azam (2001). In the 
empirical analysis, the data used span over 1980 and 2010. First, an investigation of the time series properties of 
the variables is carried out, using the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test. The ADF-test result in table 4.1 
indicates that two of the variables (CG and RCP) in the empirical model are integrated of order zero, I (0). This 
means that CG and RCP are stationary at their actual levels. 
 
Table 4.1: unit root test result. 
ADFvariables level 1
st
 difference Orderof integration 
CG -41451 Na I(0) 
CPI -1.2445 -3.342 I(1) 
RCP -3.098 na I(0) 
REER -1.3593 -3.9147 I(1) 
NEER -2.1354 -4.3065 I(1) 
Note: 5% critical value= -2.8972, na means not applicable. 
On the other hand, consumer price index (CPI) and both nominal effective exchange rate (NEER) and 
real effective exchange rate (NEER) are integrated of order one, I (1). This means that they are only stationary at 
their first difference. The variable RCP is used to capture the factors that determine the type of exchange rate 
policy measure adopted by government. 
 
 
   
 
1.1 THE MODEL 
Following Banerjee et al (1993), the model for the empirical analysis of the volatility of real effective 
exchange rate (REER) is specified as follows:  
REER = f[NEER, RCP, RCP(-1), CPI (-1)]    ------------------(4.1) 
In econometric form, equation 4.1 can be restated as follows: 
∆logREER= β0 + β1∆logNEER+ β2logRCP+ β3RCP(-1)+ β4CPI(-1)  + Ui    -----------(4.1a) 
Where: RCP=ratio of CBN’s Reserve to CBN’s credit to private sector; REER=Real Effective Exchange Rate; 
NEER= Nominal Effective Exchange Rate; CPI= Consumer Price Index; (-1) means a first lag operator;          
∆ mean a first difference operator. Note: The first difference is used to ensure stationarity while the natural log 
is used to correct possible non-linearity. 
 In line with the Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity (GARCH) model suggested 
by Ender (1995), the source of instability of REER can be investigated by testing whether inflation (CPI) is the 
major cause of volatility in the stochastic process of the relationship in equation 4.1. Thus, the source of 
volatility in REER can be tracked using equation 4.2 as follows: 
RES
2
 = f[CPI, RES
2
(-1)]   ----------------------------------------(4.2) 
In econometric form, equation 4.2 can be restated as follows: 
RES
2
  = α0+ α1∆logCPI  +  α2RES2(-1)  + Ui    ---------------(4.2a) 
Where: RES
2 
= squared residual from equation 4.1a and CPI= Consumer Price Index 
  In addition, in line with the model specified by Abiodun and Tokunbo (2006), the impact of inflation 
on the volatility of its own rate can be investigated using equation 4.3 as follows: 
CPI = f[NEER, REER, RCP, CPI(-1), CG]    -----------------------(4.3) 
By restating equation 4.3 in econometric form, we have equation 4.3a as follows: 
∆logCPI=φ0+ φ1∆logNEER + φ2∆logREER + φ3logRCP + φ4CPI(-1) + φ5logCG+Ui---(4.3a) 
Where CG=Credit to Government and NEER, REER, RCP and CPI are as earlier defined. 
 Finally, in order to isolate the actual impact of inflation on the volatility of its own rate, we perform the 
GARCH test similar to that of equation 4.2 by using equation 4.4 as follows: 
RES
2
 = f[CPI, RES
2
(-1)]   ----------------------------------------(4.4) 
Restating equation 4.4 in econometric form, we have equation 4.4a as follows: 
RES
2
 = π0  +π1∆logCPI + π2RES2(-1)  + Ui ----------------------------(4.4a) 
Where: RES
2 
= squared residual from equation 4.3a and CPI= Consumer Price Index 
 
4.2 EMPIRICAL RESULTS  
In the empirical analysis, the volatility of REERis examined through equation 4.1a. The result 
showsthat an appreciation in NEER leads to appreciation in REER and vice versa. It also shows that increase in 
the reserve will lead to decrease (appreciation) in REER. This is reflected by the negative sign of RCP in table 
4.2. 
Table 4.2: summary of result from equation 4.1a 
variable 
∆log 
NEER 
 
log 
RCP 
∆logCPI RCP(-
1) CPI(-1) 
Coefficient 0.213 
 
-0.212 -0.03 0.214 -0.03 
S.E      29.84 
 
10.7 7.10 3.15 5.02 
t-value 5.52 
 
3.72 -4.71 4.21 -4.71 
 R
2
=0.47;   ARCH(2)=14.5;   F=12.98;   D.W=1.87 
 
 However, one year-lagged value of RCP is positively related to REER. This means that it is actually 
the increase in past values of RCP that indicates the willingness of government to depreciate the naira. Further, 
table 4.2 shows that inflationrate is a very significant causal factor of volatility andinstabilityin REER. Increase 
in current periodinflation rate corresponds to a decrease (appreciation) in REER, while increase in 
oneperiodlagged value of inflation leads to increase (or depreciation of REER).  
In equation (4.2a) we analyze the actual sourceof instability of REER by testing whether inflation is the 
major cause of volatility in the stochasticprocess of the relationship in equation (4.1a). To fix this, we apply the 
GARCH process suggested by Enders(1995). The result in table 4.3 shows that inflation isactually the major 
source of volatility of REER in equation (4.1a).  
 
Table 4.3: summary of result from equation 4.2a 
variable ∆logCPI        RES2(-1) 
Coefficient 0.002 0.35 
S.E         0.23               0.08 
t-value 1.99 2.6 
N=84;  R2=0.19; F=8.6; LM- F=2.73 
   
RES2 =the square of residual from equation 4.1a 
Therefore,the result isindicative of the fact that the higher the level ofinflation the more will the real 
exchange ratedepreciate.Lastly, we investigate how inflation impacton the volatility of its own rate through 
changesin periodic values of the CPI. Table 4.4 showsthat depreciations (i.e increase) in both NEER and REER 
raisethe level of CPI.An important finding fromequation (4.3a)is the significantimpact of the past value of CPI 
on its variation. 
 
Table 4.4: summary of result from equation 4.3a 
variable ∆logNEER ∆logREER logRCP logCG CPI(-1) 
Coefficient 0.315 0.212 -0.174 0.119 0.341 
S.E         11.76          0.77      0.23    0.93          0.87 
t-value 0.432 2.79 -2.33 2.14 5.65 
R2=0.53;  ARCH(2)=15.75;  F=13.08;  D.W=2.13 
   
In order to isolate the actual impact of CPI on theinstability of inflation, we perform a GARCH 
testsimilar to that of equation (4.2a). The result of thevolatility test shown in table 4.5 indicates that changes 
inCPI are positively related to the volatility of theresidual of the CPI in equation 4.3a. 
 
Table 4.5: summary of result from equation 4.4a 
 
Where RES2 =the square of residual from equation 4.3a 
Overall, the results of the different analyseshave shown that inflation rate affect changes inreal 
exchange rate as well as its ownvolatility. Also, the effort of monetary authorityin Nigeria at using its credit and 
reserve astools in checking inflation andexchange rate instability has affected the volatility of the two variables 
over the years. Thus, monetary policy, if not well targeted could yield negative results.This is because the 
speculative activities of private agents frustrate monetary policy efforts. Just as improper inflation 
targetingcould affect real exchange rate volatility, exchange rate intervention may induce inflation (Galati, 
2000). Thus, monetarypolicy should be set in such a way that the objective it seeks to achieve is well defined 
and in such a way that efforts at stabilizing exchange rate willnot generate inflation and vice versa. 
 
V. Conclusion 
This paper has investigated how monetarypolicy objective of controlling inflation rate andintervention 
in the financing of fiscal deficitsaffect the variability of inflation and real exchangerate. The analysis is done 
using a rationalexpectation framework that incorporates the fiscalrole of exchange rate. The paper has shown 
thatthe effort of monetary policy at influencing thefinance of government fiscal deficit through thedetermination 
of the inflation-tax rate affects boththe rate of inflation and the real exchange rate,thereby causing volatility in 
their rates. The paperrevealed that inflation affects volatility of its ownrate as well as the rate of real exchange. 
The policyimport of the paper is that monetary policy shouldbe set in such a way that the objective it is 
toachieve is well defined. 
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variable ∆logCPI RES2(-1) 
Coefficient 0.453 0.07 
S.E 0.94 0.732 
t-value 5.33 1.94 
N=82;  R2=0.35; F=4.47; LM- F=2.43 
   
 
APPENDIX 1 
DATA FOR REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
year CP CG CPI NEER R LNEER LCPI RCP REER 
1980 7190.9 3.59 42.3 0.5464 3268 -0.6044 3.744787 0.454463 343 
1981 9654.2 6.61 51.2 0.61 2057 -0.4943 3.93574 0.213068 381 
1982 11371.5 10.53 55.1 0.6729 4879.2 -0.39616 4.00915 0.429073 390 
1983 12353.9 15.82 67.9 0.7241 5406 -0.32283 4.218036 0.437595 462 
1984 12942 18.19 94.8 0.7649 4818.2 -0.26801 4.551769 0.372292 638 
1984 13700.2 18.98 100 0.8938 5661.4 -0.11227 4.60517 0.413235 572 
1986 17365 19.46 105.4 2.0206 5824.6 0.703394 4.657763 0.335422 313 
1987 25476.1 22.27 116.1 4.0179 6659.6 1.390759 4.754452 0.261406 100 
1988 29773.6 27.55 181.2 4.5367 9080 1.5122 5.199601 0.304968 100 
1989 30942.8 18.32 272.7 7.3916 12712 2.000344 5.608372 0.410823 89 
1090 36630.9 21.04 293.2 8.0378 14666 2.084155 5.680855 0.400372 83 
1991 45325.2 38.49 330.9 9.9095 20722 2.293494 5.801816 0.457185 70 
1992 61020.3 80.72 478.4 17.2984 35903 2.850614 6.170447 0.588378 58 
1993 95285 189.75 751.9 22.0511 114542 3.093362 6.622603 1.202099 64 
1994 122273.3 292.16 1180.7 21.8861 137113 3.085852 7.073863 1.121365 118 
1995 175790 264.52 2040.4 21.8861 186994 3.085852 7.620901 1.063735 100 
1996 233240 117.56 2638.1 21.8861 180280 3.085852 7.877814 0.772938 124 
1997 276490 59.68 2863.2 21.8861 176928.8 3.085852 7.959695 0.63991 143 
1998 352360 133.93 3149.2 21.8861 224202 3.085852 8.054904 0.636287 159 
1999 455210 176.8 3357.6 92.6934 235250 4.529297 8.118982 0.516794 80 
2000 596000 -110.2 3590.5 102.1052 366300 4.626004 8.186047 0.614597 81 
2001 854990 -6.01 4458 111.9433 490207 4.717992 8.358901 0.573348 90 
2002 955760 373.64 4894 120.9702 628718 4.795544 8.496378 0.65782 90 
2003 1035380 552.6 5493.3 129.3565 642126 4.862572 8.611284 0.620184 85 
2004 1186958 23759.5 6320.6 133.5004 650470 4.894104 8.751569 0.548014 88 
2005 1906838 43301.8 7220.9 131.6619 808538 4.880237 8.884735 0.42402 100 
2006 1877414 68595.8 5474 128.6516 80573 4.857108 8.607765 0.042917 107 
2007 3889700 60126.4 6574 125.8331 100025 4.834956 8.790878 0.025715 105 
2008 7201479 111601 2345.7 118.5559 4521790 4.775385 7.760339 0.627897 116 
2009 5214703 113012 8976.8 119.453 3137240 4.782923 9.102399 0.601614 109 
2010 2113107 101703 4865 na 5713150 na 8.489822 2.703673 118 
Source: Nigerian Bureau of Statistics (NBS), Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) Statistical Bulletin and 
Annual Reports (Various Issues), World Development Indicators (WDI-statistics) from World Bank. 
Where: CP=credit to core private sector, CG=credit to government, CPI=consumer price index, NEER=nominal 
effective exchange rate, R=reserve of CBN, LNEER=log of NEER, LCPI=log of CPI, RCP=ratio of CBN’s 
reserve to CBN’s credit to core private sector, REER=Real effective exchange rate index (2005 = 100) from 
WDI. 
